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We develop an analytical framework to study experimental design in two-sided platforms. In the settings
we consider, customers rent listings; rented listings are occupied for some amount of time, then become
available. Platforms typically use two common designs to study interventions in such settings: customer-side
randomization (CR), and listing-side randomization (LR), along with associated estimators. We develop a
stochastic model and associated mean field limit to capture dynamics in such systems, and use our model
to investigate how performance of these estimators is affected by interference effects between listings and
between customers. Good experimental design depends on market balance: we show that in highly demand-
constrained markets, CR is unbiased, while LR is biased; conversely, in highly supply-constrained markets,
LR is unbiased, while CR is biased. We also study a design based on two-sided randomization (TSR) where
both customers and listings are randomized to treatment and control, and show that appropriate choices of
such designs can be unbiased in both extremes of market balance, and also yield low bias in intermediate
regimes of market balance.
1. Introduction
We develop a framework to study experiments (also known as A/B tests) that two-sided
platform operators routinely employ to improve the platform. Experiments are used to test
all types of interventions that affect the interactions between participants in the market;
examples include features that change the process by which buyers search for sellers, or
interventions that alter the information the platform shares with buyers about sellers.
We are particularly motivated by marketplaces where customers do not purchase goods,
but rather rent (or book) them for some amount of time. This covers a broad array of
platforms, e.g., lodging (e.g., Airbnb and Booking.com), freelancing (e.g., Upwork), and
many services (tutoring, dogwalking, child care, etc.). While we explicitly model such a
* We would like to thank Inessa Liskovich and Navin Sivanandam of Airbnb for numerous fruitful conversations which
helped to shape this work.
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2rental platform, the model we describe also captures features of a platform where goods
are bought, and supply must be replenished for future demand.
Our model consists of a fixed number of listings; customers arrive sequentially over
(continuous) time. For example, on a lodging site, listings include hotel rooms, private
rooms, houses for rent, etc.; and customers are travelers looking to book. In online labor
platforms, a freelancer offering work is a listing, and a client looking to hire a freelancer is
a customer. Naturally, an arriving customer can only rent available listings (i.e., those that
are not currently rented). The customer forms their consideration set from available listings
and then, according to a choice model, chooses which listing to rent from this set (including
an outside option). We allow the choice set formation process, the utility of a customer
for a listing, and the utility of a customer for the outside option to be heterogeneous
across listings and customers. In our paper, we employ the multinomial logit choice model;
however, since we allow for arbitrary heterogeneity, this admits a quite a general class of
demand models. Once a listing is rented, it is occupied and becomes unavailable until the
end of the occupancy time.
In this paper, we consider interventions by the platform that change the parameters
governing the choice probability of the customer, such as those described above; we refer to
the new choice parameters as the treatment model, and the baseline as the control model.1
We assume the platform wants to use an experiment to assess the difference between the
rate at which rentals would occur if all choices were made according to the treatment
parameters (the global treatment condition), and the corresponding rate if all choices were
made according to the treatment parameters (the global control condition). This is the
global treatment effect or GTE. In particular, we imagine the quantity of interest is the
steady-state (or long-run) GTE, i.e., the long-run average difference in rental rates.2
Most platforms employ one of two simple designs for testing such an intervention: either
customer-side randomization (what we call the CR design) or listing-side randomization
(what we call the LR design). In the CR design, customers are randomized to treatment or
control. All customers in treatment make choices according to the treatment choice model,
1 The same framework that we employ in this paper can be used to consider interventions that change other parame-
ters, such as customer arrival rates or the time that listings remain occupied when rented; such application is outside
the scope of our current work.
2 Our framework can also be used to evaluate other metrics of interest based on experimental outcomes; for simplicity
we focus on rate of rental in this work.
3and all customers in control make choices according to the control choice model. In the
LR design, listings are randomized to treatment or control, and the utility of a listing is
then determined by its treatment condition. As a result, in the LR design, in general each
arriving customer will consider some listings in the treatment condition and some listings in
the control condition. As an example, suppose the platform decides to test an intervention
that shows badges for certain listings. In the CR design, all treatment customers see the
badges, and no control customers see the badges. In the LR design, all customers see the
badges on treated listings, and do not see them on control listings.
Each of these designs are associated with natural estimators. In the CR design, the
platform measures the rate of rental by treatment customers, and compares to the rate of
rental by control customers; this is what we call the naive CR estimator. In the LR design,
the platform measures the rate at which treatment listings are rented, and compares to
the rate at which control listings are rented; this is what we call the naive LR estimator.
To develop some intuition for the potential biases, first consider an idealized static setting
where listings are instantly replenished upon being rented; in other words, every arriving
customer sees the full set of listings as available. As a result, in the CR design there is no
interference between treatment and control customers, and consequently the CR estimator
is unbiased for the true GTE. On the other hand, in the LR design, every arriving customer
considers both treatment and control listings when choosing whether to rent, creating a
linkage across listings through customer choice. In other words, in the LR design there is
interference between treatment and control, and in general the LR estimator will be biased
for the true GTE.
Now return to our dynamic model, where the limited inventory of listings is enforced,
i.e., listings remain unavailable for some time after rental. In this case, observe that on
top of the preceding discussion, there is a dynamic linkage between customers: the set of
listings available for consideration by a customer is dependent on the listings considered
and rented by previously arriving customers. This dynamic effect introduces a new form
of bias into estimation, and is distinctly unique to our work. In particular, because of this
dynamic bias, in general the naive CR estimator will be biased as well.
Our paper develops a dynamic model of two-sided markets with inventory dynamics,
and uses this framework to compare and contrast both the designs and estimators above,
as well as a novel class of more general designs based on two-sided randomization (of
4which the two examples above are special cases). In more detail, our contributions and the
organization of the paper are as follows.
Benchmark model and formal mean field limit. Our first main contribution is
to develop a general, flexible theoretical model to capture the dynamics described above.
In Section 3, we present a model that yields a continuous-time Markov chain in which
the state at any given time is the number of currently available listings of each type. In
Section 4, we then suggest a formal mean field analog of this continuous-time Markov
chain, by considering a limit where the number of listings in the system approaches infinity.
Scaling by the number of listings yields a continuum mass of listings in the limit. In the
mean field model, the state at a given time is the mass of available listings, and this mass
evolves via a system of ODEs. Using a Lyapunov argument, we show this system is globally
asymptotically stable, and give a succinct characterization of the resulting asymptotic
steady state of the system as the solution to an optimization problem.
Designs and estimators: Two-sided, customer-side, and listing-side random-
ization. In Section 5, we develop a more general form of experimental design, called
two-sided randomization (TSR); an analogous idea was independently proposed recently
by Bajari et al. (2019) (see also Section 2). In a TSR design, both customers and listings
are randomized to treatment and control. However, the intervention is only applied when
a treatment customer considers a treatment listing; otherwise, if the customer is in control
or the listing is in control, the intervention is not seen by the customer. (In the example
above, a customer would see the badge on a listing only if the customer were treated and
the listing were treated.) Notably, the CR and LR designs are the special cases of TSR
where all listings are treated (CR), or all customers are treated (LR). We also define natural
naive estimators for each design.
Analysis of bias: The role of market balance. Finally, in Sections 6 and 7, we
study the bias of the different designs and estimators proposed. Our main theoretical
results characterize how the bias depends on the relative volume of supply and demand
in the market. In particular, in the highly demand-constrained regime (where customers
arrive slowly and/or listings replenish quickly), the model approaches the static benchmark
described above: the naive CR estimator becomes unbiased, while the naive LR estimator
is biased. On the other hand, in the highly supply-constrained regime (where customers
arrive rapidly and/or listings replenish slowly), the dynamic bias above suggests a more
5complicated story. However, we remarkably find that in fact the naive LR estimator becomes
unbiased, while the naive CR estimator is biased. We show how to interpret these findings
via examples in Section 6.
Given these findings, it is natural to ask whether good performance can be achieved in
moderately balanced markets by “interpolating” between the naive CR and LR estimators.
We show that a naive TSR estimator that achieves this interpolation, and also propose
a more sophisticated TSR estimator that exhibits substantially improved performance in
numerical examples. This latter estimator explicitly aims to correct for interference in
regimes of moderate market balance.
Motivated by the common practice of running short-run experiments, we also study
the transient behavior of these different designs and estimators. We note that in highly
demand-constrained markets, the naive CR estimator is unbiased even in the transient
phase; informally, this is because all arriving customers see the same (full) set of available
listings. In general, however, numerical investigation of transient performance reveals that
the best design can vary depending on market balance and the time horizon of interest.
More generally, when studying these designs and estimators there will be an important
trade-off between reducing bias and increasing variance. We provide a preliminary study
of this trade-off in Section 7 and leave a more exhaustive investigation for future work.
Taken together, our work sheds light on what experimental designs and associated esti-
mators should be used by two-sided platforms depending on market conditions, to alleviate
the biases from interference that arise in such contexts. We view our work as a starting
point towards a comprehensive framework for experimental design in two-sided platforms;
we discuss some directions for future work in Section 8.
2. Related work
SUTVA. The types of interference described in these experiments are violations of the
Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) in causal inference Imbens and Rubin
(2015). SUTVA requires that the (potential outcome) observation on one unit should be
unaffected by the particular assignment of treatments to the other units. A large num-
ber of recent works have investigated experiment design in the presence of interference,
particularly in the context of markets and social networks.
Interference in marketplaces. Biases from interference can be large: Blake and Coey
(2014) empirically show in an auction experiment that the presence of interference among
6bidders caused the estimate of the treatment effect to be wrong by a factor of two. This
evidence is corroborated by Fradkin (2015), who similarly finds through simulations that
a marketplace experiment changing search and recommendation algorithms can be off by
a factor of two. Inspired by the goal of reducing such bias, other work has developed
approaches to bias characterization and reduction both theoretically (e.g., as in Basse et al.
(2016) in the context of auctions with budgets), as well as via simulation (e.g., as in Holtz
(2018) who explores the performance of LR designs).
Our work complements this line, by developing a mathematical framework for the study
of estimation bias in dynamic platforms. Key to our analysis is the use of a mean field model
to model both transient and steady-state behavior of experiments. A related approach
is taken in Wager and Xu (2019), where a mean field analysis is used to study equilib-
rium effects of an experimental intervention where treatment is incrementally applied in a
marketplace (e.g., a small pricing change).
Interference in social networks. A bulk of the literature in experimental design with
interference considers an interference that arises through some underlying social network:
e.g., Manski (2013) studies the identification of treatment responses under interference;
Ugander et al. (2013) introduces a graph cluster based randomization scheme and analyzes
the bias and variance of the design; and many other papers, including Athey et al. (2018),
Basse et al. (2019), Saveski et al. (2017) focus on estimating the spillover effects created by
interference. In general, our work is distinct because the interference pattern is endogenous
to the experiment, and dynamically evolving over time.
Other experimental designs. In practice, platforms currently mitigate the effects of
interference through either clustering techniques that change the unit of observation to
reduce spillovers among them Chamandy (2016), similar to some of the works mentioned
above (e.g., Holtz (2018), Ugander et al. (2013)); or by switchback testing Sneider et al.
(2019) , in which the treatment is turned on and off over time. Both cause a substantial
increase in estimation variance due to a reduction in effective sample size, and thus the
naive CR and LR designs remain popular workhorses in the platform experimentation
toolkit.
Two-sided randomization. Finally, a closely related paper is Bajari et al. (2019). Inde-
pendently of our own work, there the authors propose a more general multiple randomized
design of which TSR is a special case. They focus on a static model and provide an elegant
7and complete statistical analysis under a local interference assumption. By contrast, we
focus on a dynamic platform with market-wide interference patterns, and focus on a mean
field analysis of bias.
3. A Markov chain model of platform dynamics
In this section, we first introduce the basic dynamic platform model that we study in this
paper with a finite number N of listings. In the next section, we describe a formal mean
field limit of our model inspired by the regime where N →∞, that we use as the substrate
for the remainder of our analysis in the paper. This mean field limit model then serves
as the framework within which we study the bias of different experimental designs and
associated estimators.
We consider a two-sided platform where we refer to the supply side as listings and
the demand side as customers. There are a fixed number of listings in the marketplace.
Customers arrive over time and at the time of arrival, the customer can choose from the set
of available listings in the market and decide whether to rent the corresponding listing. If
the customer chooses a listing, then they rent the listing for a random time period during
which it is unavailable for other customers. At the end of this rental, the listing again
becomes available for use for other customers.
The formal details of our model are as follows. Note: we use boldface to denote vectors
throughout the paper.
Time. The system evolves in continuous time t≥ 0.
Listings. The system consists of a fixed number N of listings. We refer to ”the N ’th
system” as the instantiation of our model with N listings present. We use a superscript
”N” to denote quantities in the N ’th system where appropriate. Let m(N)(θ) denote the
total number of listings of type θ in the N ’th system. For each θ ∈ Θ, we assume that
limN→∞m(N)(θ)/N = ρ(θ)> 0. Note that
∑
θ ρ(θ) = 1.
We allow for heterogeneity in the listings. Each listing ` has a type θ` ∈Θ, where Θ is a
finite set (the listing type space). Note that in general, the type may encode both observable
and unobservable covariates; in particular, our analysis does not presume that the platform
is completely informed about the type of each customer. For example, in a lodging site
θ` may encode observed characteristics of a house such as the number of bedrooms, but
8also characteristics that are unobserved by the platform because they may be difficult or
impossible to measure. 3
State description. At each time t, each listing ` can be either available (i.e., available
for rent) or occupied (i.e., occupied by a customer who previously rented it). The system
state at time t in the N ’th system is described by σ
(N)
t = (σ
(N)
t (θ)), where σ
(N)
t (θ) denotes
the number of listings of type θ available in the system at time t. Let S
(N)
t =
∑
θ σ
(N)
t (θ)
be the total number of listings available for rent at time t. In our subsequent development,
we develop a model that makes σ
(N)
t a continuous-time Markov process.
Customers. Customers arrive to the platform sequentially and decide whether or not
to rent, and if so, which type of listing to rent. Each customer j has a type γj ∈ Γ, where
Γ is a finite set (the customer type space) that represents customer heterogeneity. As with
listings, the type may encode both observable and unobservable covariates, and again,
our analysis does not presume that the platform is completely informed about the type
of each listing. Customers of type γ arrive according to a Poisson process of rate λ
(N)
γ ;
these processes are independent across types. Let λ(N) =
∑
γ λ
(N)
γ be the total arrival rate
of customers. Let Tj denote the arrival time of the j’th customer.
We assume that limN→∞ λ(N)/N = λ > 0, and that for each γ ∈ Γ, we have
limN→∞ λ
(N)
γ /λ(N) = φγ > 0. Note that
∑
γ φγ = 1.
Consideration sets. In practice, when customers arrive to a platform, they typically
form a consideration set of possible listings to rent; the initial formation of the consideration
set may depend on various aspects of the search and recommendation algorithms employed
by the platform. To simplify the model, we capture this process by assuming that on
arrival, each listing of type θ available at time t is included in the arriving customer’s
consideration set independently with probability αγ(θ)> 0 for a customer of type γ. For
example, αγ can capture the possibility that the platform’s search ranking is more likely
to highlight available listings of type θ that are more attractive for a customer of type γ,
making these listings more likely to be part of the customer’s consideration set; this effect
is made clear via our choice model presented below. After the consideration set is formed,
a choice model is then applied to the consideration set to determine whether a booking (if
any) is made.
3 Our analysis does not consider improved estimation via use of observed covariates; this remains an interesting
direction for future investigation.
9Formally, the customer choice process unfolds as follows. Suppose that customer j arrives
at time Tj. For each listing `, let Cj` = 0 if the listing is unavailable at Tj. Otherwise,
if listing ` is available, then let Cj` = 1 with probability αγj(θ`), and let Cj` = 0 with
probability 1−αγj(θ`), independently of all other randomness. Then the consideration set
of customer j is {` :Cj` = 1}.
Customer choice. Customers choose at most one listing to rent; they can also choose
not to rent at all. We assume that customers have a utility for each listing that depends
on its type: a type γ customer has utility vγ(θ) > 0 for a type θ listing. (Note that all
utilities are positive.). Let qj` denote the probability that arriving customer j of type γj
rents listing ` of type θ`.
In this paper we assume that customers make choices according to the well-known multi-
nomial logit choice model. In particular, given the realization of Cj, we have:
qj` =
Cj`vγj(θ`)

(N)
γj +
∑n
`′=1Cj`′vγj(θ`′)
. (1)
Here 
(N)
γ > 0 is the value of the outside option for type γ customers in the N ’th system. In
particular, the probability that customer j does not book any listing at all grows with 
(N)
γ .
We let the outside option scale withN ; this is motivated by the observation that in practical
settings, the probability a customer does not make a rental should remain bounded away
from zero even for very large systems. In particular, we assume that limN→∞ 
(N)
γ /N = γ >
0.
For later reference, we define:
qj(θ) =E
[∑
`:θ`=θ
qj`
]
, (2)
where the expectation is over the randomness in Cj. With this definition, qj(θ) is the
probability that customer j rents an available listing of type θ, where the probability is
computed prior to realization of the consideration set.
Dynamics: A continuous-time Markov chain. The system evolves as follows. Ini-
tially all listings are available.4. Every time a customer arrives, the choice process described
above unfolds. An occupied listing remains occupied, independent of all other randomness,
4 As the system we study is irreducible and we analyze its steady state behavior, it would not matter if we chose a
different initial condition.
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for an exponential time that is allowed to depend on the type of the listing.5 More formally,
let τ > 0 and for each type θ define ν(θ) such that, once booked, a listing of this type will
remain occupied for an exponential time with parameter τν(θ). We overload notation and
write τ(θ) = τν(θ). Once this time expires, the listing returns to being available.
When fixing these ν(θ) and all system parameters except for τ , increasing τ will make
the system less supply constrained and decreasing τ will make the system more supply
constrained, while preserving the relative occupancy times of each listing type.
Our preceding specification turns σ
(N)
t into a continuous-time Markov process on a finite
state space S(N) = {σ : 0≤ σ(θ)≤m(N)(θ), ∀θ}. We now describe the transition rates of
this Markov process. For a state σ ∈ S(N), σ(θ) represents the number of available listings
of type θ.
There are only two types of transitions possible: either (i) a listing that is currently
occupied becomes available, or (ii) a customer arrives, and rents a listing that is currently
available. (If a customer arrives but does not rent anything, the state of the system is
unchanged.) Let eθ denote the unit basis vector in the direction θ, i.e., eθ(θ) = 1, and
eθ(θ
′) = 0 for θ′ 6= θ. The rate of the first type of transition is:
R(σ,σ+ eθ) = (m
(N)(θ)−σ(θ))τ(θ), (3)
since there are m(N)(θ)−σ(θ) booked listings of type θ, and each remains occupied for an
exponential time with mean 1/τ(θ), independently of all other randomness.
The second type of transition requires some more steps to formulate. In principle, our
choice model suggests that the identity of both the arriving guest and individual listings
affect system dynamics; however, our state description only tracks the aggregate number
of listings of each type available at each time t. The key here is that our entire specification
depends on guests only through their type, and depends on listings only through their
type.
Formally, suppose a customer j of type γj = γ arrives to find the system in state σ.
For each θ let Dγ(θ) be a Binomial(σ(θ), αγ(θ)) random variable, independently across θ.
5 An even more general model might allow the occupancy time to depend on both listing type and the type of the
customer who made the booking; such a generalization remains an interesting open direction.
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Recall that for each available listing `, each Cj` is a Bernoulli(αγ(θl)) random variable.
Recalling qj(θ) as defined in (2), it is straightforward to check that:
qj(θ) = rγ(θ|σ),E
[
Dγ(θ)vγ(θ)

(N)
γ +
∑
θ′Dγ(θ
′)vγ(θ′)
]
. (4)
In other words, the probability an arriving customer of type γ rents a listing of type θ
when the state is σ is given by rγ(θ|σ); and this probability depends on the past history
only through the state σ (ensuring the Markov property holds).
With this definition at hand, for states σ with σ(θ)> 0, the rate of the second type of
transition is:
R(σ,σ− eθ) =
∑
γ
λ(N)γ rγ(θ|σ). (5)
Note that the resulting Markov chain is irreducible, since customers have positive prob-
ability of sampling into, and renting from, their consideration set, and every listing in the
consideration set has positive probability of being rented.
Steady state. Since the Markov process defined above is irreducible on a finite state
space, there is a unique steady state distribution pi(N) on S(N) for the process. In terms of
this steady state distribution note that:
S
(N)
=
∑
σ∈S(N)
pi(N)(σ)
∑
θ
σ(θ)
is the steady state expected number of available listings. Thus we refer to S
(N)
/N as the
steady state availability in the N ’th system, and we refer to (N − S(N))/N as the steady
state occupancy in the N ’th system.
4. A mean field model of platform dynamics
The continuous-time Markov process described in the preceding section is challenging to
analyze directly because the customers’ choices involving consideration sets induce complex
dynamics. Instead, to make progress we consider a formal mean field limit of that process,
motivated by the regime where N →∞, in which the evolution of the system becomes
deterministic. We first present and describe the intuition behind a mean field analogue of
the Markov processes; then we prove that the sequence of Markov processes converges to
the mean field analogue as N →∞.
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We consider a continuum model with a unit mass of listings. The total mass of listings
of type θ in the system is ρ(θ)> 0 (recall that
∑
θ ρ(θ) = 1). We represent the state at time
t by st = (s(θ), θ ∈Θ); st(θ) represents the mass of listings of type θ available at time t.
The state space for this model is:
S = {s : 0≤ s(θ)≤ ρ(θ)}.
We first present the intuition behind our mean field model. Consider a state s∈ S with
s(θ)> 0 for all θ. We view this state as analogous to a state σ ≈Ns in the N ’th system.
We consider the system dynamics defined by (3)-(5). Note that the rate at which occupied
listings of type θ become available is (m(N)(θ)− σ(θ))τ(θ), from (3). If we divide by N ,
then this rate becomes (ρ(θ)−s(θ))τ(θ) as N →∞. On the other hand, note that for large
N , if Dγ(θ) is Binomial(σ(θ), αγ(θ)), then Dγ(θ)/N concentrates on αγ(θ)s(θ). Thus the
choice probability rγ(θ|σ) becomes approximately:
pγ(θ|s), αγ(θ)vγ(θ)s(θ)
γ +
∑
θ′ αγ(θ
′)vγ(θ′)s(θ′)
. (6)
(Here we use the fact that 
(N)
γ /N → γ as N →∞.) This is the mean field multinomial logit
choice model for our system. Now the rate at which listings of type θ become occupied is∑
γ λ
(N)
γ rγ(θ|σ), from (5). If we divide by N , this rate becomes λ
∑
γ φγpγ(θ|s) as N →∞.
Inspired by the preceding observations, we define the following system of differential
equations for the evolution of st:
d
dt
st(θ) = (ρ(θ)− st(θ))τ(θ)−λ
∑
γ
φγpγ(θ|st), θ ∈Θ. (7)
This is our formal mean field model. In the remainder of this section, we first show that
this system has a unique solution for any initial condition. Then we prove that the sequence
of Markov processes indeed converges to this mean field model. Finally, we characterize the
behavior of the mean field limit. By constructing an appropriate Lyapunov function, we
show that the mean field model has a unique limit point to which all trajectories converge
(regardless of initial condition). This limiting point is the unique steady state of the mean
field limit, and can be used as a large system approximation of the steady state of the
N ’th finite system.
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4.1. Existence and uniqueness of mean field trajectory
First, we show the straightforward result that the system of ODEs defined in (7) possesses a
unique solution. This follows by an elementary application of the Picard-Lindelo¨f theorem
from the theory of differential equations. The proof is in Appendix A.
Proposition 1. Fix an initial state sˆ ∈ S. The system (7) has a unique solution {st :
t≥ 0} satisfying 0≤ st(θ)≤ ρ(θ) and for all t and θ, and s0 = sˆ.
4.2. Convergence to the mean field limit
Now we formally describe the sense in which our system converges to the system in (7). We
first move from analyzing the number of listings available in the N ’th system to analyzing
the proportion of listings available. To this end, define the normalized process Y
(N)
t where
Y
(N)
t (θ) = σ
(N)
t (θ)/N, θ ∈Θ.
Note that under this definition, Y
(N)
t is also a continuous time Markov process with dynam-
ics induced by the dynamics of σ
(N)
t . The chain Y
(N)
t has the same rate of transitions as
σ
(N)
t but increments are of size 1/N .
Let IN denote the state space of the N ’th chain. Then
IN =
{
y : 0≤ y(θ)≤ m
(N)(θ)
N
,y(θ) =
i
N
for i∈Z,∀θ
}
(8)
The transition rates follow from the transition rates of σ
(N)
t given in (3)-(5). Let eθ
denote the unit basis vector in the direction θ. The rate at which listings are replenished
is
R(y,y+
eθ
N
) = (m(N)(θ)−Ny(θ))τ(θ). (9)
The rate at which listings are booked is
R(y,y− eθ
N
) =
∑
γ
λ(N)γ r
(N)
γ (θ|y), (10)
where
r(N)γ (θ|y) =E
[
D
(N)
γ (θ)vγ(θ)

(N)
γ +
∑
θ′D
(N)
γ (θ′)vγ(θ′)
]
(11)
and Dγ(θ) is a Binomial(Ny(θ), αγ(θ)) random variable.
The following theorem establishes the convergence of Y
(N)
t to the solution of the ODE
described in (7) as N →∞.
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Theorem 1. Assume that 
(N)
γ /N → γ for all γ and λ(N)γ /N → λγ for all γ as N →
∞. Let sˆ ∈ S denote the initial condition for the system of ODEs and assume that
m(N)(θ)/N → sˆ(θ) for all θ. Let st denote the unique solution to the system defined in (7).
Then for all δ > 0 and for all times u> 0,
P
[
sup
0≤t≤u
‖Y (N)t − st‖> δ
]
=O
(
1
N
)
. (12)
The proof for this result, which relies on an application of Kurtz’s Theorem for the
convergence of pure jump Markov processes, is in Appendix A.
4.3. Existence and uniqueness of mean field steady state
Finally, we characterize the behavior of the mean field limit. We show that the system
of ODEs in (7) has a unique limit point, to which all trajectories converge regardless of
the initial condition. We refer to this as the steady state of the mean field system. We
prove the result via the use of a convex optimization problem; the objective function of
this problem is a Lyapunov function for the mean field dynamics that guarantees global
asymptotic stability of the steady state.
Formally, we have the following result. The proof is in Appendix A.
Theorem 2. There exists a unique steady state s∗ ∈ S for (7), i.e., a unique vector
s∗ ∈ S solving the following system of equations:
(ρ(θ)− s∗(θ))τ(θ) = λ
∑
γ
φγpγ(θ|s∗), θ ∈Θ. (13)
This limit point has the property that 0< s∗(θ)< ρ(θ) for all θ, i.e., it is in the interior
of S. Further, this limit point is globally asymptotically stable, i.e., all trajectories of (7)
converge to s∗ as t→∞, for any initial condition s0 ∈ S.
The limit point s∗ is the unique solution to the following optimization problem:
minimize W (s), λ
∑
γ
(
φγ log
(
γ +
∑
θ
αγ(θ)vγ(θ)s(θ)
))
− τ(θ)
∑
θ
ρ(θ) log s(θ) + τ(θ)
∑
θ
s(θ) (14)
subject to 0≤ s(θ)≤ ρ(θ), θ ∈Θ. (15)
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The function W appearing in the proposition statement is not convex; our proof proceeds
by first noting that it suffices to restrict attention to s such that s(θ)> 0 for all θ, then
making the transformation y(θ) = log(s(θ)). The objective function redefined in terms of
these transformed variables is strictly convex, and this allows us to establish the desired
result.
5. Experiments: Designs and estimators
In this section, we leverage the framework developed in the previous section to undertake
a study of experimental designs a platform might employ to test interventions in the
marketplace. For simplicity, we focus on interventions that change the choice probability
of one or more types of customers for one or more types of listings, and we assume the
platform is interested in estimating the resulting rate at which rentals take place. However,
we believe the same approach we employ here can be applied to study other types of
interventions and platform objectives as well.
Formally, the platform’s goal is to design experiments with associated estimators to
assess the performance of the intervention (the treatment), relative to the status quo (the
control). In particular, the platform is interested in determining the steady-state rate of
rental when the entire market is in the treatment condition (i.e., global treatment), com-
pared to the steady-state rate of rental when the entire market is in the control condition
(i.e., global control). We refer to the difference of these two rates as the global treatment
effect. It is important to emphasize that this is a steady-state quantity as typically a
platform is interested in the long-run effect of an intervention.
Two types of canonical experimental designs are employed in practice: listing-side ran-
domization (denoted LR) and customer-side randomization (denoted CR). In the former
design, listings are randomized to treatment or control; in the latter design, customers are
randomized to treatment or control. Each design also has an associated natural ”naive”
estimator of rental probability. As we discuss, these estimators will typically be biased,
due to interference effects.
The LR and CR designs are special cases of a more general two-sided randomization
(TSR), where both listings and customers are randomized to treatment and control simul-
taneously. (TSR designs were also independently introduced and studied in recent work by
Bajari et al. (2019); see Section 2 for discussion.) In the next subsection we develop the rel-
evant formalism for these designs; we then subsequently define natural ”naive” estimators
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that are commonly used for the LR and CR designs, as well as an interpolation between
these two as an estimator for a TSR design. In the remainder of the paper we study the
bias of these different designs and estimators under different market conditions.
5.1. Experimental design
Treatment condition. We consider a binary treatment: every customer and listing in the
market will either be in treatment or control. (Generalization of our model to more than two
treatment conditions is relatively straightforward.) We model the treatment condition by
expanding the set of customer and listing types. For every customer type γ ∈ Γ, we create
two new customer types (γ,0), (γ,1); and for every listing type θ ∈Θ, we create a two new
listing types (θ,0), (θ,1). The types (γ,0), (θ,0) are control types; the types (γ,1), (θ,1) are
treatment types.
Two-sided randomization. We assume that a fraction aC of customers are randomized
to treatment, and a fraction 1 − aC are randomized to control, independently; and we
assume that a fraction aL of listings are randomized to treatment, and a fraction 1−aL are
randomized to control, independently. This is the two-sided randomization (TSR) design:
randomization takes place on both sides of the market simultaneously.
Treatment as a choice probability shift. Examples of interventions that platforms
may wish to test include the introduction of higher quality photos for a hotel listing on a
lodging site, or showing previous job completion rates of a freelancer on an online labor
market. These interventions change the choice probability of listings by customers. In
particular, we continue to assume the multinomial logit choice model, and we assume that
for a type γ customer and a type θ listing that have been given the intervention, the utility
becomes v˜γ(θ)> 0; the utility of the outside option becomes ˜γ > 0; and the probability of
inclusion in the consideration set becomes α˜γ(θ)> 0.
In the TSR designs that we consider, a key feature is that the intervention is applied
only when a treated customer interacts with a treated listing. For example, when an online
labor marketplace decides to show previous job completion rates of a freelancer as an
intervention, only treated customers can see these rates, and they only see them when they
consider treated freelancers. We model this by redefining quantities in the experiment as
follows:
vγ,0(θ,0) = vγ,1(θ,0) = vγ,0(θ,1) = vγ(θ); vγ,1(θ,1) = v˜γ(θ); (16)
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αγ,0(θ,0) = αγ,1(θ,0) = αγ,0(θ,1) = αγ(θ); αγ,1(θ,1) = α˜γ(θ); (17)
γ,0 = γ; γ,1 = ˜γ. (18)
This definition is a natural way to incorporate randomization on each side of the market.
However, we remark here that it is not necessarily canonical; for example, an alternate
design would be one where the intervention is applied when either the customer has been
treated or the listing has been treated. Even more generally, the design might randomize
whether the intervention is applied, based on the treatment condition of the customer and
the listing. In all likelihood, the relative advantages of these designs would depend not only
on the bias they yield in any resulting estimators, but also in the variance characteristics of
those estimators. We leave further study and comparison of these designs to future work.
Customer-side and listing-side randomization. Two special cases of the TSR design
are as follows. When aL = 1, all listings are in the treatment condition; in this case, ran-
domization only takes place on the customer side of the market. This is the customer-side
randomization (CR) design. When aC = 1, all customers are in the treatment condition;
in this case, randomization only takes place on the listing side of the market. This is the
listing-side randomization (LR) design.
System dynamics. With the specification above, it is straightforward to adapt our
mean field system of ODEs, cf. (7), and the associated choice model (6), to this setting.
The key changes are as follows:
1. The mass of control (resp., treatment) listings of type (θ,0) (resp., (θ,1)) becomes
(1 − aL)ρ(θ) (resp., aLρ(θ)). In other words, abusing notation, we define ρ(θ,0) =
(1− aL)ρ(θ), and ρ(θ,1) = aLρ(θ).
2. The arrival rate of control (resp., treatment) customers of type (γ,0) (resp., (γ,1))
becomes (1−aC)λφγ (resp., aCλφγ). Thus we define φγ,0 = (1−aC)φγ, and φγ,1 = aCφγ.
3. The choice probabilities are defined as in (6), with the relevant quantities defined
according to (16)-(18).
Using Proposition 1 and Theorems 2, we know that there exists a unique solution to
the resulting system of ODEs; and that there exists a unique limit point to which all
trajectories converge, regardless of initial condition. This limit point is the steady state
for a given experimental design. For a TSR experiment with treatment customer fraction
aC , and treatment listing fraction aL, we use the notation st(aC , aL) = (st(θ, j)|aC , aL), θ ∈
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Θ, j ∈ {0,1}) to denote the ODE trajectory, and we use s∗(aC , aL) = (s∗(θ, j)|aC , aL), θ ∈
Θ, j ∈ {0,1}) to denote the steady state.
Rate of rental. In our subsequent development, it will be useful to have a shorthand
notation for the rate at which rentals of listings of treatment condition j ∈ {0,1} are made
by customers of treatment condition i ∈ {0,1}, in the interval [0, T ]. In particular, we
define:
Qij(T |aC , aL) = λ
T
∫ T
0
∑
θ
∑
γ
φγ,ipγ,i(θ, j|st(aC , aL)) dt. (19)
Further, since st(aC , aL) is globally asymptotically stable, bounded, and converges to
s∗(aC , aL) as t→∞, we have:
Qij(∞|aC , aL), lim
T→∞
Qij(T |aC , aL) = λ
∑
θ
∑
γ
φγ,ipγ,i(θ, j|s∗(aC , aL)). (20)
Global treatment effect. Recall we assume the steady-state rate of rental is the quan-
tity of interest to the platform. In particular, the platform is interested in the change in
this rate from the global control condition (aC = 0, aL = 0) to the global treatment condition
(aC = 1, aL = 1).
In the global control condition, the steady state rate at which guests rent is: QGC =
Q00(∞|0,0), and in the global treatment condition, the steady state rate at which guests
rent is QGT =Q11(∞|1,1). Thus the global treatment effect is GTE=QGT−QGC.
We remark that the rate of rental decisions made by arriving customers will change over
time, even if the market parameters are constant over time (including the arrival rates of
different customer types, as well as the utilities that customers have for each listing type).
This transient change in rental rates is driven by changes in the state st; in general, such
fluctuations will lead the transient rate of rental to differ from the steady-state rate, for all
values of aC and aL (including global treatment and global control). It is for this reason
that we specifically aim to measure the global treatment effect as a comparison of the
steady state behavior in the global treatment and global control counterfactual worlds, to
capture, informally, the long run change in behavior due to an intervention.
5.2. Estimators: Transient and steady state
Thus the goal of the platform is to use the experiment to estimate GTE. In this section
we consider estimators the platform might use to estimate this quantity. We first con-
sider the CR and LR designs, and we define “naive” estimators that the platform might
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use to estimate the global treatment effect. These designs and estimators are those most
commonly used in practice. We define these estimators during the transient phase of the
experiment, as that is the most practically relevant regime (since A/B tests are run for a
fixed duration in practice). We then also define associated steady-state versions of these
estimators. Finally, we combine these estimation approaches in a natural heuristic that
can be employed for any general TSR design.
Estimators for the CR design. We start by considering the CR design, i.e., where
aL = 1 and aC ∈ (0,1). A simple naive estimate of the rate of rental is to measure the rate
at which rentals are made in a given interval of time by control customers, and compare
this to the analogous rate for treatment customers. Formally, suppose the platform runs
the experiment for the interval t∈ [0, T ], with a fraction aC of customers in treatment. The
rate at which customers of treatment condition i∈ {0,1} rent in this period is Qi1(T |aC ,1).
The naive CR estimator is the difference between treatment and control rates, where we
correct for differences in the size of the control and treatment groups, by scaling with the
respective masses:
ĜTE
CR
(T |aC) = Q11(T |aC ,1)
aC
− Q01(T |aC ,1)
1− aC . (21)
We let ĜTE
CR
(∞|aC) =Q11(∞|aC ,1)/aC −Q01(∞|aC ,1)/(1− aC) denote the steady-state
naive CR estimator.
Estimators for the LR design. Analogously, we can define a naive estimator for the
LR design, i.e., where aC = 1 and aL ∈ (0,1). Formally, suppose the platform runs the
experiment for the interval t∈ [0, T ], with a fraction aL of listings in treatment. The rate at
which listings with treatment condition j ∈ {0,1} are rented in this period is Q1j(T |1, aL).
The naive LR estimator is the difference between treatment and control rates, again scaled
by the mass of listings in each group:
ĜTE
LR
(T |aL) = Q11(T |1, aL)
aL
− Q10(T |1, aL)
1− aL . (22)
We let ĜTE
LR
(∞|aL) =Q11(∞|1, aL)/aL−Q10(∞|1, aL)/(1−aL) denote the corresponding
steady-state naive LR estimator.
Estimators for the TSR design. As with the LR and CR designs, it is possible to
design a natural naive estimator for the TSR design as well. In particular, we have the
following definition of the naive TSR estimator:
ĜTE
TSR
(T |aC , aL) = Q11(T |aC , aL)
aCaL
−Q01(T |aC , aL) +Q10(T |aC , aL) +Q00(T |aC , aL)
1− aCaL . (23)
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To interpret this estimator, observe that the first term is the normalized rate at which treat-
ment customers booked treatment listings in the experiment; we normalize this by aCaL,
since a mass aC of customers are in treatment, and a mass aL of listings are in treatment.
This first term estimates the global treatment rate of rental. The sum Q01(T |aC , aL) +
Q10(T |aC , aL) +Q00(T |aC , aL) is the total rate at which control rentals took place: either
because the customer was in the control group, or because the listing was in the con-
trol group, or both. (Recall that in the TSR design, the intervention is only seen when
treatment customers interact with treatment listings.) This is normalized by the comple-
mentary mass, 1− aCaL. This second term estimates the global control rate of rental. As
before, we can define a steady-state version of this estimator as ĜTE
TSR
(∞|aC , aL), with
the steady-state versions of the respective quantities on the right hand side of (23).
It is straightforward to check that as aL→ 1, we have ĜTE
TSR
(T |aC , aL)→ ĜTE
CR
(T |aC),
the naive CR estimator. Similarly, as aC → 1, we have ĜTE
TSR
(T |aC , aL)→ ĜTE
LR
(T |aL),
the naive LR estimator. In this sense, the naive TSR estimator naturally ”interpolates”
between the naive LR estimator and the naive CR estimator. We exploit this interpolation
to choose aC and aL as a function of market conditions in the next section (in particular,
dependent on the imbalance between demand and supply). More generally, inspired by the
idea of interpolating between the naive CR estimator and the naive LR estimator, we also
explore an alternative, more sophisticated TSR estimator.
6. Analysis of bias: Examples
In the remainder of the paper, we study the behavior of the CR, LR, and TSR designs and
associated naive estimators proposed in the previous section. We are particularly interested
in characterizing the bias: i.e., the extent to which the estimators we have defined under-
or overestimate the true GTE.6
In this section, we start with a simple discussion via example that illustrates the main
effects that cause bias. Throughout the discussion, we assume that there are N = 2 listings
in total in the market, and that listings are homogenous (i.e., of identical type). Further,
we also assume that arriving customers are homogeneous (i.e., of identical type). We let
v > 0 denote the utility of a customer for a listing, and suppose the platform considers an
6 Because we work in the mean field limit, an unbiased estimator is one that would actually be consistent in a
statistical sense. Again, a rigorous proof of such a fact is outside the scope of this paper.
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intervention that changes this to v˜ > 0. Finally, we assume that every arriving customer
includes any listing that is available in her consideration set.
An important operational finding of our work is that the market balance λ/τ has a
significant influence in determining which estimator and design is bias-optimal. When λ/τ
becomes large, the market is relatively supply-constrained: customers are arriving much
faster than occupied listings become available. When λ/τ becomes small, the market is
demand-constrained, with few customers arriving and many available listings. We divide
our discussion of this example into these two extreme cases. Our findings are illustrative
of the insights we obtain theoretically in the next section.
6.1. Highly demand-constrained markets
Consider a hypothetical limit where each listing becomes instantly available again after
being rented (i.e., τ →∞ but λ remains fixed). This is the demand-constrained extreme,
where capacity constraints on listings become irrelevant. Note that on arrival of a customer,
both listings are always available, and therefore, in her consideration set. In this limit,
observe that the steady-state rate at which customers rent listing `= 1,2 becomes:
λv
+ 2v
. (24)
(The factor 2 appears in the denominator as there are two listings.) Since the intervention
changes v to v˜, the GTE is:
GTE=
2λv˜
+ 2v˜
− 2λv
+ 2v
.
Now suppose we consider a CR design that randomizes a fraction aC of arriving customers
to treatment. Observe that in this demand-constrained extreme, every arriving control
(resp., treatment) customer sees the full global control (resp., treatment) market condition;
there is no dynamic influence of one customer’s rental behavior on any other customer.
This suggests the naive CR estimator should correctly recover the global treatment effect.
Indeed, the steady-state naive CR estimator becomes:
ĜTE
CR
(∞|aC) = 1
aC
2aCλv˜
+ 2v˜
− 1
1− aC
2(1− aC)λv
+ 2v
=GTE.
In other words, the naive CR estimator is perfectly unbiased.
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On the other hand, consider a LR design where listing 1 is (randomly) assigned to
treatment, and listing 2 is (randomly) assigned to control. In this design, the steady-state
naive LR estimator (with aL = 1/2) becomes:
ĜTE
LR
(∞|aL) = 1
aL
λv˜
+ v+ v˜
− 1
1− aL
λv
+ v+ v˜
.
It is clear that in general this will not be equal to the GTE, because there is interference
between the two listings: every arriving customer sees a market environment that is neither
quite global treatment nor global control, and the estimates reflect this imperfection. Even
with immediate replenishment, treatment listings compete for customers and ”cannibalize”
rentals from control listings, causing the naive LR estimator to be biased. (Note that such
a violation would arise for virtually any reasonable choice model that could be considered.)
6.2. Highly supply-constrained markets
Now we consider the opposite extreme, where the market is heavily supply constrained; in
particular, we consider the hypothetical limit where λ→∞ but τ remains fixed. Now in
this case, note that a listing that becomes available will nearly instantaneously be booked;
therefore, virtually every arriving customer will find at most one of the two listings avail-
able, and their decision of whether to book will be entirely determined by comparison of
that available listing against the outside option. In particular, as a result when λ→∞ the
steady-state rate at which listing `= 1,2 is rented approaches τ .
We thus require a more refined estimate of this rental rate as λ→∞. Suppose λ is
large, and suppose listing ` becomes available. Based on the intuition above, we make the
approximation that the listing will be considered in isolation by a succession of customers
until it is rented. Customers arrive at rate λ, and rent an available listing with probability
v/(+ v); in other words, in this regime listings compete only with the outside option,
and not with each other. Therefore the mean time until such a rental occurs is (+ v)/λv;
and once booked, the listing remains rented for mean time 1/τ , at which time it becomes
available again. Therefore for large λ, the steady-state rate at which a listing ` = 1,2 is
rented is approximately: (
+ v
λv
+
1
τ
)−1
. (25)
As expected, this rate approaches τ as λ→∞. The GTE is thus:
GTE= 2
(
+ v˜
λv˜
+
1
τ
)−1
− 2
(
+ v
λv
+
1
τ
)−1
.
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With this observation in hand, suppose we again consider the same LR design where
listing 1 is (randomly) assigned to treatment, and listing 2 is (randomly) assigned to
control. Since in (25) there is no influence of one listing on the other, observe that the
naive LR estimator (with aL = 1/2) becomes:
ĜTE
LR
(∞|aL) = 1
aL
(
+ v˜
λv˜
+
1
τ
)−1
− 1
1− aL
(
+ v
λv
+
1
τ
)−1
=GTE.
In other words, the naive LR estimator is perfectly unbiased. This is intuitive: in the limit
where λ is large, since listings do not compete with each other for rentals, there is no
interference when we implement the LR design.
On the other hand, consider the naive CR design where a fraction aC of arriving customers
are randomized to treatment. In this case we wish to establish the rate at which rentals
are made by treatment and control customers respectively. Suppose listing ` was occupied
by a treatment customer, and becomes available. Define:
ζ(aC) = aC v˜/(+ v˜) + (1− aC)v/(+ v).
This is the probability an arriving customer rents the available listing. Customers arrive at
rate λ, so a mean time 1/(λζ(aC)) elapses until a rental is made; the listing then remains
occupied for mean time 1/τ . Conditional on a rental, the rental was made by a treatment
guest with probability:
η(aC) =
1
ζ(aC)
aC v˜
+ v˜
.
Thus the mean time between treatment rentals of listing ` is a geometrically distributed
multiple of 1/(λζ(aC))+1/τ , with parameter η(aC); in other words, the mean rate at which
listing ` is rented by treatment customers is:(
1
η(aC)
·
(
1
λζ(aC)
+
1
τ
))−1
=
(
+ v˜
aCλv˜
+
1
η(aC)τ
)−1
.
We can use the same logic for the rental rate of control customers, and so we find the naive
CR estimator is:
ĜTE
CR
(∞|aC) = 2
aC
(
+ v˜
aCλv˜
+
1
η(aC)τ
)−1
− 2
1− aC
(
+ v
(1− aC)λv +
1
(1− η(aC))τ
)−1
.
In general, this estimator will be biased, i.e., not equal to GTE. The issue is that in this
case, customers have a dynamic influence on each other across the treatment groups: when
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a listing becomes available, whether or not it is available for booking by a subsequent
control customer depends on whether or not a treatment customer had previously booked
the listing. In this case, customers compete among each other for listings. This interference
across customer groups leads to the biased expression for the naive CR estimator.
We note that the GTE and naive LR estimators converge to zero in the limit where
λ→∞; this is because the rental rate of each listing becomes τ in this limit. The naive
CR estimator does not converge to zero in general, however, as λ→∞.
6.3. Discussion: Violation of SUTVA
Our simple example illustrates that the naive LR estimator is biased when λ→ 0, and
unbiased when λ→∞; and the naive CR estimator is unbiased when λ→ 0, while it is
biased when λ→∞. These findings can be interpreted through the lens of the classical
potential outcomes model; in that model, an important result is that when the stable unit
treatment value assumption (SUTVA) holds, then naive estimators of the sort we consider
will be unbiased for the true treatment effect. SUTVA requires that the treatment condition
of units other than a given customer or listing should not influence the potential outcomes
of that given customer or listing. The discussion above illustrates that in the limit where
λ→ 0, there is no interference across customers in the CR design; this is why the naive CR
estimator is unbiased. Similarly, in the limit where λ→∞, there is no interference across
listings in the LR design; this is why the naive LR estimator is unbiased. On the other hand,
the cases where each estimator is biased involve interference across experimental units.
7. Analysis of bias: Results
We establish two key theoretical results in this section: in the limit of a highly supply-
constrained market (where λ/τ →∞), the naive LR estimator becomes an unbiased esti-
mator of the GTE, while the naive CR estimator is biased. On the other hand, in the limit
of a highly demand-constrained market (where λ/τ → 0), the naive CR estimator becomes
an unbiased estimator of the GTE, while the naive LR estimator is biased. In other words,
each of the two naive designs is respectively optimal in the limits of extreme market imbal-
ance. These results are match the findings in our simple example in the preceding section.
At the same time, we find empirically that neither estimator performs well in the region
of moderate market balance.
Inspired by this finding, we consider TSR and associated estimators that naturally inter-
polate between the two naive designs depending on market balance. We first consider the
25
naive TSR estimator. Given the findings above, we show that a simple approach to adjust-
ing aC and aL as a function of market balance yields performance that balances between
the naive LR estimator and the naive CR estimator. Nevertheless, we show there is signif-
icant room for improvement, by adjusting for the types of experimental interference that
arise using observations from the TSR experiment. In particular, we propose a heuristic
for a novel interpolating estimator for the TSR design that aims to correct these biases,
and yields surprisingly good empirical performance. We conclude with a brief discussion
of transient performance of the estimators considered, and some insights derived through
numerical investigation.
7.1. Theory: Steady-state bias in unbalanced markets
In this section, we theoretically study the bias of the steady-state naive CR and LR estima-
tors in the limits where the market is extremely unbalanced (either demand-constrained
or supply-constrained). The key tool we employ is a characterization of the asymptotic
behavior of Qij(∞|aC , aL) as defined in (20) in the limits where λ/τ → 0 and λ/τ →∞. We
use this characterization in turn to quantify the asymptotic bias of the naive estimators
relative to the GTE.
7.1.1. Highly demand-constrained markets We start by considering the behavior of
naive estimators in the limit where λ/τ → 0. We start with the following proposition that
characterizes behavior of Qij(∞|aC , aL) as λ/τ → 0. The proof is in Appendix A.
Proposition 2. Fix all system parameters except λ and τ , and consider a sequence of
systems in which λ/τ → 0. Then along this sequence,
1
λ
Qij(∞|aC , aL)→
∑
θ
∑
γ
φγ,ipγ,i(θ, j|ρ). (26)
The expression on the right hand side depends on both aC and aL through φγ,i and ρ
respectively. In particular, we recall that φγ,1 = aCφγ, φγ,0 = (1 − aC)φγ, and ρ(θ,1) =
aLρ(θ), ρ(θ,0) = (1− aL)ρ(θ). In our subsequent discussion in this regime, to emphasize
the dependence of ρ on aL below, we will write ρ(aL) = (ρ(θ, j|aL), θ ∈Θ, j = 0,1). With
this definition, we have ρ(θ,1|aL) = aLρ(θ), ρ(θ,0|aL) = (1− aL)ρ(θ).
The proposition shows that in this limit, the (scaled) rate of rental behaves as if the
available listings of type (θ, j) was exactly ρ(θ, j|aL) for every θ and treatment condition
j = 0,1. It is as if every arriving customer sees the entire mass of listings as being available,
26
as in our simplified example in the previous section; in that example, 1/τ → 0, and so
rentals are immediately replenished.
We use the preceding result to study the bias of the steady-state naive CR and LR
estimators in the limit where λ/τ → 0. Consider a sequence of systems where λ/τ → 0.
Using the preceding result, we observe that:
1
λ
GTE=
1
λ
Q11(∞|1,1)− 1
λ
Q00(∞|0,0)→
∑
θ
∑
γ
φγpγ,1(θ,1|ρ(1))−
∑
θ
∑
γ
φγpγ,0(θ,0|ρ(0)).
(27)
We now use Proposition 2 to show that the steady-state naive CR estimator is unbiased
in the limit as λ/τ → 0, while the steady-state naive LR estimator remains biased. First
we consider a CR experiment paired with the naive CR estimator. Using Proposition 2, it
follows that:
1
λ
ĜTE
CR
(∞|aC)→ 1
aC
∑
θ
∑
γ
aCφγpγ,1(θ,1|ρ(1))− 1
1− aC
∑
θ
∑
γ
(1− aC)φγpγ,0(θ,1|ρ(1)).
Now note that ρ(θ,1|1) = ρ(θ) and ρ(θ,0|1) = 0 when aL = 1; similarly, ρ(θ,0|0) = ρ(θ), and
ρ(θ,1|0) = 0 when aL = 0. Thus, from the definition of the TSR design in (16)-(18) and the
definition of the choice probability in (48), the choice probability of a control customer for
a treatment listing at ρ(1) is the same as the choice probability of a control customer for
a control listing at ρ(0):
pγ,0(θ,1|ρ(1)) = pγ,0(θ,0|ρ(0)).
These choice probabilities are the same because (1) all listings are in treatment in the
CR design, with the mass of each type θ equal to ρ(θ); and (2) control customers have
the same choice model parameters for these listings regardless of whether they are in
treatment or control. Thus it follows that ĜTE
CR
(∞|aC)/λ−GTE/λ→ 0 as λ/τ → 0, i.e.,
the steady-state naive CR estimator is asymptotically unbiased.
On the other hand, consider the steady-state naive LR estimator. Observe that:
1
λ
ĜTE
LR
(∞|aL)→ 1
aL
∑
θ
∑
γ
φγpγ,1(θ,1|ρ(aL))− 1
1− aL
∑
θ
∑
γ
φγpγ,1(θ,0|ρ(aL)).
In general, this limit will not be equivalent to the GTE; i.e., the naive LR estimator is
asymptotically biased. The reason is that ρ(aL) is different from both ρ(1) (all listings in
treatment) and ρ(0) (all listings in control): in the LR design, there is a positive mass of
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listings in both treatment and control, and this means the choice probabilities do not match
those in either global treatment (in the first term) or global control (in the second term).
This is exactly the same interference between listings of different treatment conditions
that we saw in the simple example in the preceding section, in which listings compete for
customers.
Based on the preceding discussion, we observe that the difference between ĜTE
LR
(∞|aL)
and the GTE does not converge to zero in general as λ/τ → 0; i.e., the naive LR estimator
is biased. However, the naive CR estimator is unbiased in this limit. We summarize in the
following theorem.
Theorem 3. Consider a sequence of systems where λ/τ → 0. Then for all aC such
that 0< aC < 1, ĜTE
CR
(∞|aC)/λ−GTE/λ→ 0. However, for 0< aL < 1, generically over
parameter values7 we have lim ĜTE
LR
(∞|aC)/λ−GTE/λ 6= 0.
7.1.2. Heavily supply-constrained markets We now characterize the behavior of naive
estimators in the limit where λ/τ →∞. We start with the next proposition, where we study
the behavior of Qij as λ/τ →∞. The proof is in Appendix A. To state the proposition, we
define:
gγ,i(θ, j) =
αγ,i(θ, j)vγ,i(θ, j)
γ,i
.
Proposition 3. Fix all system parameters except λ and τ , and consider a sequence of
systems in which λ/τ →∞. Along this sequence, the following limit holds:
Qij(∞|aC , aL)
τ
→
∑
θ
( ∑
γ φγ,igγ,i(θ, j)∑
i′=0,1
∑
γ φγ,i′gγ,i′(θ, j)
)
ρ(θ, j)ν(θ, j). (28)
As before, the expression on the right hand side depends on both aC and aL through
φγ,i and ρ respectively. In particular, we recall that φγ,1 = aCφγ, φγ,0 = (1− aC)φγ, and
ρ(θ,1) = aLρ(θ), ρ(θ,0) = (1− aL)ρ(θ).
A key intermediate result we employ is to demonstrate that in the steady-state in this
limit, s∗(θ, j|aC , aL)→ 0 for all θ, j. We know that in the steady state of the mean field
limit, the rate at which occupied listings become available must match the rate at which
7 Here ”generically” means for all parameter values, except possibly for a set of parameter values of Lebesgue measure
zero.
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available listings become occupied (flow conservation). We use this fact to show that to
first order in λ/τ , in the limit where λ/τ →∞ we have:
s∗(θ, j|aC , aL)≈ 1
λ/τ
· ρ(θ, j)ν(θ, j)∑
γ
∑
i=0,1 φγ,igγ,i(θ, j)
.
The proposition follows by using this limit to characterize the choice probabilities.
The proof of the preceding proposition reveals that in the limit where λ/τ →∞, we
have:
pγ,i(θ, j|s∗(aC , aL))≈ gγ,i(θ, j)s∗(θ, j|aC , aL) = αγ,i(θ, j)vγ,i(θ, j)s
∗(θ, j|aC , aL)
γ,i
.
This preceding expression is the formalization of our intuition from the preceding section:
in the limit where the market is heavily supply-constrained, it is as if each arriving customer
seeing an available listing compares only that listing to the outside option; there is no
longer any competition between listings.
We can use the preceding proposition to understand the behavior of the global treatment
effect, the naive LR estimator, and the naive CR estimator in steady-state, as λ/τ →∞.
For simplicity, we hold τ constant and consider the limit λ→∞. In this case, the preceding
proposition shows that:
Q11(∞|1,1)→ τ
∑
θ
ρ(θ)ν(θ,1); Q00(∞|0,0)→ τ
∑
θ
ρ(θ)ν(θ,0).
Thus as seen in our simple example, the global treatment effect GTE→ 0 in this limit.
We also note that:
Q11(∞|1, aL)→ aLτ
∑
θ
ρ(θ)ν(θ,1); Q10(∞|1, aL)→ (1− aL)τ
∑
θ
ρ(θ)ν(τ,0).
The preceding two expressions reveal that the steady-state naive LR estimator
GTELR(∞|aL) in this setting approaches zero, matching the GTE; thus it is asymptotically
unbiased.
Finally, it is also now straightforward to see why the CR design will be biased. Note
that:
Q11(∞|aC ,1)→ aCτ
∑
θ
( ∑
γ φγgγ,1(θ,1)∑
γ
∑
i′=0,1 φγ,i′gγ,i′(θ,1)
)
ρ(θ)ν(θ,1).
An analogous expression holds for Q01(∞|aC ,1). We see that the right hand side reflects
the dynamic interference created between treatment and control customers: just as in our
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simple example, whether or not an available listing is seen by, e.g., a control customer
depends on whether it has previously been booked by a treatment customer. That is,
customers compete for listings. As in the example, the naive CR estimator will remain
nonzero in general in the limit, even though the GTE approaches zero.
We summarize our discussion in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Consider a sequence of systems where λ/τ →∞. Then GTE/τ → 0, and
for all aL such that 0 < aL < 1, there also holds ĜTE
LR
(∞|aL)/τ → 0. However, for 0 <
aL < 1, generically over parameter values we have lim ĜTE
CR
(∞|aC)/τ −GTE/τ 6= 0.
7.1.3. An example: Homogeneous customers and listings In this section, we consider
a setting analogous to the examples of Section 6: we assume that both listings and cus-
tomers are homogeneous, i.e., there is only one type of customer and one type of listing.
Further, as in Section 6, we assume that v is the baseline (i.e., control) utility of a customer
for a listing, and v˜ is the post-intervention (i.e., treatment) utility of a customer for a
listing. We assume  is the outside option value of both control and treatment customers,
and that α0(0) = α1(1) = 1.
In this case, we consider two limits: one where λ is fixed and τ →∞ (the highly demand-
constrained regime), and one where τ is fixed and λ→∞ (the highly supply-constrained
regime). These match the two limits taken in Section 6.
In the first case, when τ →∞ with λ fixed, if we apply Proposition 2, we obtain:
Q00(∞|aC , aL)→λ · (1− aC)(1− aL)ρv
+ ρv
; (29)
Q10(∞|aC , aL)→λ · aC(1− aL)ρv
+ (1− aL)ρv+ aLρv˜ ; (30)
Q01(∞|aC , aL)→λ · (1− aC)aLρv
+ ρv
; (31)
Q11(∞|aC , aL)→λ · aCaLρv˜
+ (1− aL)ρv+ aLρv˜ . (32)
In this limit,
GTE→ λ · ρv˜
+ ρv˜
− ρv
+ ρv
.
From these expressions it is clear that the naive CR estimator is unbiased, while the naive
LR estimator is biased. Further, the expressions reveal that listing-side randomization
creates interference across listings.
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In the second case, when λ→∞ with τ fixed, if we apply Proposition 3, we obtain:
Q00(∞|aC , aL)→τ(1− aC)(1− aL)ρ; (33)
Q10(∞|aC , aL)→τaC(1− aL)ρ; (34)
Q01(∞|aC , aL)→τ · (1− aC)v
(1− aC)v+ aC v˜ aLρ; (35)
Q11(∞|aC , aL)→τ · aC v˜
(1− aC)v+ aC v˜ aLρ. (36)
In this limit, GTE→ 0. From these expressions it is clear that the naive CR estimator is
biased, while the naive LR estimator is unbiased. Further, these expressions also reveal
that customer-side randomization creates interference across customers.
Interestingly, these expressions highlight a remarkable symmetry. As expected, in the
limit of a highly demand-constrained market, customers choose among listings; thus there is
competition for customers among listings, and this is the source of potential interference in
LR designs. The expressions reveal that in the limit of a highly supply-constrained market,
it is as if listings choose among customers; thus there is competition among customers, and
this is the source of potential interference in CR designs. Indeed, the expressions in (33)-
(36) take the form of a multinomial logit choice model of listings for customers. We believe
this type of symmetry provides important insight into the nature of experimental design
in two-sided markets, and in particular the roots of the interference typically observed in
such settings.
7.2. Estimation with the TSR design
The preceding section reveals that each of the naive LR and CR estimators has its virtue,
depending on market balance conditions. In this section, we explore whether we can develop
TSR designs in which aC and aL are chosen as a function of λ/τ , to obtain the benefi-
cial asymptotic performance of the naive CR estimator in the highly-demand constrained
regime, as well as the LR estimator in the highly supply-constrained regime.
Recall the naive TSR estimator defined in (23), and in particular the steady-state version
of this estimator. Suppose the market observes λ/τ ; note that this is reasonable from a
practical standpoint as this is a measure of market imbalance involving only the overall
arrival rate of customers and the average rate at which listings become available. For
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example, consider the following heuristic choices of aC and aL for the TSR design, for some
fixed values of aC and aL:
aC(λ/τ) =
(
1− e−λ/τ)+ aCe−λ/τ ; aL(λ/τ) = aL (1− e−λ/τ)+ e−λ/τ . (37)
Then as λ/τ → 0, we have aC(λ/τ)→ aC and aL(λ/τ)→ 1, while as λ/τ →∞ we have
aC(λ/τ)→ 1 and aL(λ/τ)→ aL.8. With these choices, it follows that in the highly demand-
constrained limit (λ/τ → 0), the naive TSR estimator becomes equivalent to the naive CR
estimator, while in the highly supply-constrained limit (λ/τ →∞), the naive TSR estimator
becomes equivalent to the naive LR estimator. In particular, using Propositions 2 and 3,
it is straightforward to show that the steady-state naive TSR estimator is unbiased in both
limits; we state this as the following theorem, and omit the proof.
Corollary 1. For each λ/τ , consider the TSR design with aC and aL defined as in
(37). Consider a sequence of systems where either λ/τ → 0, or λ/τ →∞. Then in either
limit:
ĜTE
TSR
(∞|aC(λ/τ), aL(λ/τ))−GTE→ 0.
Figure 1 reveals the steady-state performance of the different naive estimators (CR, LR,
and TSR with the preceding scaling of aC and aL), as a function of market balance λ/τ .
The figures show the difference between each estimator and GTE; the estimators are all
upward-biased because of the parameter values chosen, though the qualitative findings in
the figure are robust across parameter choices. As we see, the naive TSR estimator performs
well in each asymptotic regime.
We are also led to ask whether we can improve upon the naive TSR estimator when
the market is moderately balanced. Note that the naive TSR estimator does not explicitly
correct for either the fact that there is interference across listings, or the fact that there
is interference across customers. We now suggest a heuristic for correction of these effects
that leads to an improved interpolating TSR estimator; this is the fourth estimator that
appears in Figure 1.
First, abusing notation, let GTECR(T |aC , aL) denote the estimator in (21) using the same
terms from a TSR design, and dividing through by aL on both terms as normalization.
8 Our choice of exponent here is somewhat arbitrary; the same analysis follows even if we replace e−λ/τ with e−cλ/τ
for any value of c > 0.
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Similarly abusing notation, let GTELR(T |aC , aL) denote the estimator in (21) using the same
terms from a TSR design, and dividing through by aC on both terms as normalization.
Motivated by these naive estimators, we explicitly consider an interpolation between the
LR and CR estimators of the form:
βĜTE
CR
(T |aC , aL) + (1−β)ĜTE
LR
(T |aC , aL). (38)
Now, consider the quantityQ00(T |aC , aL)/((1−aC)(1−aL))−Q10(T |aC , aL)/((1−aC)aL)
in a TSR design. This is the (appropriately normalized) difference between the rate at which
control customers book control listings, and the rate at which treatment customers book
control listings. Note that the difference between control customers and treatment cus-
tomers is that the latter are exposed to treatment listings, while the former are not. Hence,
the difference in steady-state rates of rental among these two groups on control listings
must be driven by the fact that treatment customers substitute rentals from control list-
ings to treatment listings (or vice versa). This difference is precisely the ”cannibalization”
effect (i.e., interference) that was found in LR designs in the highly demand-constrained
regime.
Thus motivated, we subtract an appropriately weighted “correction term” for the
LR design from our interpolating TSR estimator in (38). (This argument is of course
heuristic: it ignores dynamic effects in regimes of intermediate market balance.) Using a
symmetric argument we also subtract an appropriately weighted correction term associ-
ated to interference across customers in a CR design: Q00(T |aC , aL)/((1− aL)(1− aC))−
Q01(T |aC , aL)/((1 − aC)aL). (Similar correction terms were also studied in Bajari et al.
(2019); see the related work for further details on this work.) We weight these correction
terms in a market-balance-dependent fashion, based on the direction of market balance in
which we have seen that the respective interference grows. Combining these insights, for
β ∈ (0,1) our improved TSR estimator is given by:
ĜTE
TSRI
(T |aC , aL) =
β
[
Q11(T |aC , aL)
aCaL
− Q01(T |aC , aL)
(1− aC)aL − (1−β)
(
Q00(T |aC , aL)
(1− aC)(1− aL) −
Q01(T |aC , aL)
(1− aC)aL
)]
+ (1−β)
[
Q11(T |aC , aL)
aCaL
− Q10(T |aC , aL)
aC(1− aL) −β
(
Q00(T |aC , aL)
(1− aC)(1− aL) −
Q10(T |aC , aL)
aC(1− aL)
)]
,
(39)
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Figure 1 Left: Difference between estimator and GTE in steady state. We consider variation in λ/τ by fixing
τ = 1 and varying λ; analogous results are obtained if λ is fixed and τ is varied. Right: transient behavior of
estimators. Again we fix τ = 1. For both plots, we set γ,i = 1, αγ,i = 0.5 for all γ, i. In the CR design, aC = 1/2. In
the LR design, aL = 1/2. There are three listing types and two customer types. Utilities for γ1 are
vγ1(θ1) = 1.5, vγ1(θ2) = 3, vγ1(θ3) = 6.v˜γ1(θ1) = 1, v˜γ1(θ2) = 8, v˜γ1(θ3) = 12. Utilities for γ2 are
vγ2(θ1 = 1, vγ2(θ2) = 2, vγ2(θ3) = 4.v˜γ2(θ1) = 0.5, v˜γ2(θ2) = 6, v˜γ2(θ3) = 8.
Given market balance λ/τ , we set β = e−λ/τ , and we choose aC and aL as in (37).
In the limit where λ/τ → 0, note that ĜTETSRI(T |aC(λ/τ), aL(λ/τ))→ ĜTE
CR
(T |aC) as
expected. Similarly, in the limit where λ/τ →∞, we have ĜTETSRI(T |aC(λ/τ), aL(λ/τ))→
ĜTE
LR
(T |aL). In particular, it is straightforward to show as a result that this new estima-
tor is also unbiased in both the highly demand-constrained and highly supply-constrained
regimes. In these limits, the correction terms play no role. However, for moderate values
of market balance, both the cannibalization correction terms kick in.
7.3. Transient behavior
For practical implementation, it is important to consider the relative bias in the candidate
estimators in the transient system. Theoretically, we can provide some insight when τ →∞:
in this case, the dominant term in the right hand side of (7) is (ρ(θ) − st(θ))τ . Using
this fact, it can be shown that as τ →∞, for each t > 0, there holds s∗t (aC , aL)→ ρ(aL)
(where we define ρ(aL) as in Section 7.1). In other words, the state remains at ρ(aL) at all
times. As a result in this limit the transient estimators ĜTE
CR
(T |aC) and ĜTE
LR
(T |aL) are
equivalent to ĜTE
CR
(∞|aC) and ĜTE
LR
(∞|aL), respectively. In particular, asymptotically
as τ →∞, the transient estimator ĜTECR(T |aC , aL) will be an unbiased estimate of GTE
at all times T > 0. (The same is true if λ→ 0, provided the initial state is s0 = ρ(aL).)
More generally, Figure 1 numerically investigates how the time horizon of the experiment
affects the performance of the estimators; there we plot an example where λ/τ takes
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a moderate value. The relative performance of estimators depends on the time horizon
of interest as well as market balance conditions. In Appendix B, we present two other
examples as well that illustrate this phenomenon.
7.4. Variance of estimators
It is important to note that at finite T , the experimenter should also be concerned about
the variance of any estimator used. In particular, even if the system only consists of a finite
number of listings N , as T →∞ the standard error of the various estimators proposed in
this paper will converge to zero. However, for finite T , this is not the case, and variance
of estimation becomes an important consideration alongside bias, particularly in choosing
between multiple estimators with similar bias. The variance of the TSR estimators is espe-
cially important, given the earlier discussion that many heuristics that platforms use to
minimize bias do so at the cost of increased variance, leading to underpowered experiments
(see Section 2).
With this background as motivation, in this subsection we provide a preliminary yet
suggestive simulation study of variance. Our mean field analysis provides a theoretical
asymptotic comparison of bias between different designs and associated estimators. Based
on that analysis, we have already seen that TSR designs can be chosen to provide reason-
ably low bias across a wide range of market balance conditions. In this section, our main
motivation is to understand the variance of each estimator, and to compare this variance
to the bias.
As we discuss below, the simulations suggest several important considerations that a
platform must take into account when designing and analyzing an experiment. The first is
that the estimator with the lowest variance will change depending on market balance: the
design and estimator with the lowest variance for a demand-constrained regime might have
the highest variance for a supply-constrained regime. The second is that there is a bias-
variance tradeoff between the naive CR and LR estimators and the TSR estimators. The
TSR estimators, as discussed earlier, offer benefits with respect to bias, but do so at the cost
of a moderate increase in variance. Finally, there is a bias-variance tradeoff between the
two TSR estimators themselves. The naive TSR estimator ĜTE
TSR
has slightly higher bias
and lower variance, whereas the improved TSR estimator ĜTE
TSRI
, with heuristic correction
terms to decrease bias, has lower bias but higher variance.
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Figure 2 Left: Average bias (normalized by GTE) of each estimator across 500 runs. Right: Standard error of
estimates, calculated across 500 runs. The standard error is shown as a percentage of the lowest standard error
for the given λ/τ . For both plots, we consider a setting with homogeneous listings and customers. In the CR
design, aC = 0.5. In the LR design, aL = 0.5. Parameters are defined in Appendix C.
Full details of the simulation environment and model parameters are in Appendix C. We
briefly summarize them here. We simulate marketplace experiments with varying market
parameters for a finite system with a number of listings N = 1000, and a fixed time horizon
T . For each run of the simulation, we fix an experiment design (e.g., CR, LR, TSR), and
then simulate customer arrival and booking decisions until time T . System evolution is
simulated according to the continuous time Markov chain specified in (3)-(5). We calculate
the estimator corresponding to the experiment design, defined in (21)-(23) and (39), for
the time interval [T0, T ], where T0 is chosen to eliminate the burn-in period. We then
simulate multiple runs and compare the average bias and the standard error of the various
estimators across runs.
In this section, we present simulations for a homogeneous system with only one customer
and one listing type; similar findings are obtained in more general scenarios, cf. Appendix
C. We set the utility that the customer has for a listing so that in a balanced market with
λ= τ , the customer has a 20 percent (resp., 23 percent) booking probability in the steady
state of the global control (resp., global treatment) mean field model.
In the completely homogeneous setting, we find that the lowest variance estimator
depends on market conditions. For example, in a demand-constrained market with λ/τ =
0.1, ĜTE
CR
has the lowest standard error, whereas in a supply-constrained market with
λ/τ = 10, ĜTE
CR
has the highest standard error. Figure 2 compares the standard error of
each estimator with the standard error of the lowest-variance estimator at each level of
relative demand λ/τ . Overall, the standard error of ĜTE
TSR
is low and quite close to the
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lowest standard error across market conditions. The standard error of ĜTE
TSRI
is higher,
especially for the market condition where λ = τ , where the standard error is 36 percent
higher than that of the ĜTE
LR
estimator. For the extremes of market imbalance, the stan-
dard error of ĜTE
TSRI
is within 15 percent of the lowest standard error observed.
As noted above, we also investigate several other settings, with various levels of hetero-
geneity in listings, customers, and treatment effects (see Appendix C). Similar observations
hold for these settings as well. These simulations suggest that TSR estimators do have
increased variance compared to the naive CR and LR estimators, but in many cases, par-
ticularly in unbalanced markets, do not exhibit a large increase. We conclude by noting
that it may be possible to optimize the bias-variance trade off of the TSR estimators with
careful choices of aC and aL. This question is an interesting direction that we leave for
future work.
8. Conclusion
This paper has proposed a general mean field framework to study the dynamics of inven-
tory bookings in two-sided platforms, and we have leveraged this framework to study the
design and analysis of a number of different experimental designs and estimators. We study
both commonly used designs and estimators (CR, LR), as well as more general two-sided
randomization designs and estimators (TSR). Our work sheds light on the market condi-
tions in which each approach to estimation performs best, based on the relative supply
and demand balance in the marketplace.
We suggest two significant directions for future work. The first is further optimization
of the TSR design as a standalone experiment design. We have proposed two natural TSR
estimators, but the space of both designs and estimators is much richer and it is worth
asking which are optimal with respect to bias and variance. The second direction is to
develop the TSR design as a method to debias one-sided experiments. The design allows us
to measure competition effects between customers and between listings; this observation
suggests that these measurements can be used to approximately debias existing CR and
LR experiments, providing another route for platforms to utilize two-sided randomization
inference.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 For each θ ∈Θ, define fθ(s) to be the right hand side of (7):
fθ(s) = (ρ(θ)− s(θ))τ(θ)−λ
∑
γ
φγpγ(θ|s).
Let f denote the |Θ|-dimensional vector-valued function where each component is defined by fθ. For a fixed
c > 0 define the set I = (−c,∞) of times t for which we wish to show the solution is unique. We require that
st ∈ S for all t∈ I and s0 = sˆ.
By the Picard-Lindelo¨f theorem Edwards et al. (2014), if f(s) is Lipschitz continuous for all s ∈ S, then
there exists a unique solution {st : t∈ I} on the entire time interval I with the desired initial condition. We
will show that each component fθ(s) satisfies the Lipschitz condition, which then implies that the vector-
valued function f(s) satisfies the condition.
Consider the partial derivatives of fθ(s) with respect to each s(θ
′):
∂fθ(s)
∂s(θˆ)
=
−λ
∑
γ
φγ · (γ+
∑
θ′ αγ(θ
′)s(θ′)vγ(θ′))·αγ(θ)vγ(θ)−αγ(θ)2s(θ)v2γ(θ)
(γ+
∑
θ′ αγ(θ′)s(θ′)vγ(θ′))2
− τ(θ), θˆ= θ;
λ
∑
γ
φγ · αγ(θ)
2s(θ)vγ(θ)s(θˆ)vγ(θˆ)
(γ+
∑
θ′ αγ(θ′)s(θ′)vγ(θ′))2
, θˆ 6= θ.
The partial derivatives of fθ(s) are continuous and (since γ > 0 for all γ) are bounded on S, and so fθ(s) is
Lipschitz continuous on S. It follows then that f(s) is Lipschitz on S and so there exists a unique solution
{st : t≥ 0} to (7) in S such that s0 = sˆ.
Proof of Theorem 1 Kurtz’s theorem (see Kurtz (1970), Kurtz (1971), Darling (2002)) states that if the
sequence of Markov jump processes and the fluid limit satisfy certain conditions on some set R, then on
this set R, the sequence of Markov processes will converge to the fluid limit. (There may be regions in the
state space where the Markov chain does not converge to the fluid limit.) Through an application of Kurtz’s
theorem, we show that this convergence holds on the entire state space S of the mean field ODE.
First we define some necessary notation. Let T
(N)
i denote the time of the i’th jump; in the proof we
suppress the index (N) and instead write Ti. Let
µ(N)(y) =E[Y (N)Ti+1 −Y (N)Ti |Y (N)Ti+1 = y]
and
Σ(N)(y) = Var[Y
(N)
Ti+1
−Y (N)Ti |Y (N)Ti+1 = y]
denote the mean and covariance of the increments and c(N)(y) be the rate function such that Ti+1 − Ti ∼
exp(1/c(N)(y)) if Y
(N)
Ti
= y. Define
b(N)(y) = c(N)(y)µ(N)(y).
Note that for each N we have IN ⊆S, where IN is the state space of Y (N)t and S is the state space of the
mean field ODE.
We need to show that there exists κ1, κ2, and κ3 such that the following four conditions hold:
Initial Conditions: For all δ > 0,
P[‖Y (N)0 − sˆ‖> δ]≤ κ1(δ)/N, (40)
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where Y
(N)
0 (θ) denotes the initial condition of the chain.
Mean dynamics: There exists a Lipschitz vector field b : S →S such that
sup
y∈IN
‖b(N)(y)− b(y)‖→ 0. (41)
Noise converges to zero: There exists κ2, κ3 such that the following two conditions hold:
sup
y∈IN
c(N)(y)≤ κ2N (42)
sup
y∈IN
Trace[Σ(N)(y)] + ‖µ(N)(y)‖2 ≤ κ3N−2. (43)
Once we show that (40)-(43) are satisfied, Theorem 1 follows from an application of Kurtz’s theorem to
this setting.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that
max
θ
|m(N)(θ)−Nsˆ(θ)|< 1
for all N . If this does not hold for all N , we can simply consider the tail of the sequence {m(N)} for which
this holds. Because we assume that limN→∞m(N)(θ)/N = sˆ(θ) for all θ, we know that this tail sequence
exists.
Similarly, we can assume that there exists a constant C such that for all γ
λ(N)γ
N
≤Cλγ .
Step 1: Show (40) holds. The initial condition for the chain is Y
(N)
0 (θ) =m
(N)(θ)/N . Note that there
is no randomness in our initial conditions and so the probability in (40) is either 0 or 1.
Let δ > 0 be given. Let N(δ) be the smallest N such that |Θ|/δ2 <N and define
κ1(δ) =
|Θ|
δ2
.
Note that
‖Y (N)0 − sˆ‖= ‖
m(N)
N
− sˆ‖ ≤
√
|Θ|
N
.
Then for N ≥N(δ), (40) holds since √
|Θ|
N
< δ.
For N <N(δ), the right hand side of (40) is greater than or equal to 1, by construction of N(δ), and thus
the condition holds.
Step 2: Show (41) holds. Define b : S →S to be the ODE defined in (7), where each component of b is
given by
bθ(y) = (ρ(θ)− s(θ))τ(θ)−
∑
γ
λγpγ(θ|y), θ ∈Θ (44)
and
pγ(θ|y), αγ(θ)vγ(θ)y(θ)
γ +
∑
θ′ αγ(θ
′)vγ(θ′)y(θ′)
. (45)
We have already shown in the proof of Proposition 1 that b is Lipschitz on S and so we need only to prove
convergence.
39
In the N ’th system,
b
(N)
θ (y) = c
(N)(s)µ
(N)
θ (s)
=
1
N
(
m(N)(θ)−Ny(θ)) τ(θ)− 1
N
∑
γ
λ(N)γ r
(N)
γ (θ|y)
where
r(N)γ (θ|y) =E
[
D(N)γ (θ)vγ(θ)

(N)
γ +
∑
θ′D
(N)
γ (θ′)vγ(θ′)
]
and each D(N)γ (θ)∼Bin(Ny(θ), αγ(θ)).
First we show that for any y ∈ S , b(Nk)θ (y)→ bθ(y) along the sequence {Nk}k∈N for which y ∈ INk .
The function b(N) : IN → IN is only defined for those y ∈ S where Ny(θ)∈Z for all θ. Let y ∈ S be given.
Let {Nk} be the subset of all integers such that y ∈ INk . Note that if y ∈ IN for some N , then y ∈ IN′ if
N ′ is a multiple of N and thus {Nk}k∈N is indeed a subsequence of N. We show that for all θ we have
b
(Nk)
θ (y)→ bθ(y) as k→∞.
We have assumed that the initial conditions are such that m(N)(θ)/N → sˆ(θ) as N →∞ and so it only
remains to show that for each θ
1
Nk
λ(Nk)γ r
(Nk)
γ (θ|y)→ λγpγ(θ|y).
To see this, observe that we can write r(Nk)γ (θ|y) as
r(Nk)γ (θ|y) =E
[
D(Nk)γ (θ)vγ(θ)/Nk

(Nk)
γ /Nk +
∑
θ′D
(Nk)
γ (θ′)vγ(θ′)/Nk
]
.
For all θ we have D(Nk)γ /Nky(θ)→ αγ(θ) almost surely by the Strong Law of Large Numbers and so
D(Nk)γ (θ)vγ(θ)/Nk→ αγ(θ)y(θ)vγ(θ)
almost surely. Then
D(Nk)γ (θ)vγ(θ)/Nk

(Nk)
γ /Nk +
∑
θ′D
(Nk)
γ (θ′)vγ(θ′)/Nk
→ αγ(θ)y(θ)vγ(θ)
+
∑
θ′ αγ(θ
′)y(θ′)vγ(θ′)
almost surely.
For all N , ∣∣∣∣∣ D(Nk)γ (θ)vγ(θ)/Nk(Nk)γ /Nk +∑θ′D(Nk)γ (θ′)vγ(θ′)/Nk
∣∣∣∣∣≤ 1
and thus, by the Bounded Convergence Theorem,
lim
k→∞
r(Nk)γ (θ|y) = lim
k→∞
E
[
D(Nk)γ (θ)vγ(θ)/Nk

(Nk)
γ /Nk +
∑
θ′D
(Nk)
γ (θ′)vγ(θ′)/Nk
]
=E
[
lim
k→∞
D(Nk)γ (θ)vγ(θ)/Nk

(Nk)
γ /Nk +
∑
θ′D
(Nk)
γ (θ′)vγ(θ′)/Nk
]
=E
[
αγ(θ)y(θ)vγ(θ)
+
∑
θ′ αγ(θ
′)y(θ′)vγ(θ′)
]
=
αγ(θ)y(θ)vγ(θ)
+
∑
θ′ αγ(θ
′)y(θ′)vγ(θ′)
= pγ(θ|y).
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Then since λ(N)γ /N → λγ by assumption,
1
Nk
λ(Nk)γ r
(Nk)
γ (θ|y)→ λγpγ(θ|y)
and so for all y ∈ S and for all θ, b(Nk)θ (y)→ bθ(y) as k→∞.
We can then conclude that supy∈IN ‖b(N)(y)− b(y)‖→ 0.
Step 3: Show (42) holds.
For each y ∈ IN the rate function is bounded by
c(N)(y) =
∑
θ
[(
m(N)(θ)−Ny(θ)) τ(θ) +∑
γ
λ(N)γ rγ(θ|y)
]
≤N · |Θ| · τ(θ) +N ·C
∑
γ
λγ
and so (42) is satisfied.
Step 4: Show (43) holds.
Here we rely on the fact that increments in Y
(N)
t (θ) are of size 1/N .
Part (a): Show ‖µ(N)(y)‖2 =O(N−2) for all y ∈ IN .
Let y ∈ SN . Each component of µ(N)(y) is given by
µ
(N)
θ (y) =
1
N
· (m(N)(θ)−Ny(θ)) τ(θ)− 1
N
∑
γ
λ(N)γ r
(N)
γ (θ|y)
c(N)(y)
.
Then
‖µ(N)(y)‖2 =
∑
θ
(
µ
(N)
θ (y)
)2
=
1
N2
∑
θ
((
m(N)(θ)−Ny(θ)) τ(θ)−∑
γ
λ(N)γ r
(N)
γ (θ|y)
c(N)(y)
)2
=
1
N2
·
∑
θ
((
m(N)(θ)−Ny(θ)) τ(θ)−∑γ λ(N)γ r(N)γ (θ|y))2(∑
θ
(m(N)(θ)−Ny(θ)) τ(θ) +∑
γ
λ
(N)
γ r
(N)
γ (θ|y)
)2
≤ 1
N2
where the last inequality comes from the observation that the terms
(
m(N)(θ)−Ny(θ)) τ(θ) and∑
γ
λ(N)γ r
(N)
γ (θ|y) are nonnegative for all θ and so(∑
θ
(
m(N)(θ)−Ny(θ)) τ(θ) +∑
γ
λ(N)γ r
(N)
γ (θ|y)
)2
≥
∑
θ
((
m(N)(θ)−Ny(θ)) τ(θ) +∑
γ
λ(N)γ r
(N)
γ (θ|y)
)2
≥
∑
θ
((
m(N)(θ)−Ny(θ)) τ(θ)−∑
γ
λ(N)γ r
(N)
γ (θ|y)
)2
.
Part (b): Show Trace[Σ(N)(y)] =O(N−2).
Trace
[
Σ(N)(y)
]
=
∑
θ
Var
[
Y
(N)
Tn+1
(θ)−Y (N)Tn (θ)|Y (N)Tn = y
]
=
∑
θ
E
[(
Y
(N)
Tn+1
(θ)−Y (N)Tn (θ)
)2
|YTn = y
]
−
∑
θ
E
[
Y
(N)
Tn+1
(θ)−Y (N)Tn (θ)|YTn = y
]2
=
∑
θ
E
[(
Y
(N)
Tn+1
(θ)−Y (N)Tn (θ)
)2
|YTn = y
]
−‖µ(N)(y)‖2.
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Consider the first term on the right hand side.∑
θ
E
[(
Y
(N)
Tn+1
(θ)−Y (N)Tn (θ)
)2
|YTn = y
]
=
∑
θ
1
N2
· (m(N)(θ)−Ny(θ)) τ(θ) + 1
N2
∑
γ
λ(N)γ r
(N)
γ (θ|y)
c(N)(y)
=
1
N2
·
∑
θ
[(
m(N)(θ)−Ny(θ)) τ(θ) +∑
γ
λ(N)γ r
(N)
γ (θ|y)
]
c(N)(y)
=
1
N2
.
Since we have shown that ‖µ(N)(s)‖2 =O(N−2) in Part (a), (43) is satisfied.
Thus conditions (40) - (43) hold and Theorem 1 follows from Kurtz’s Theorem.
Proof of Theorem 2 Let Y = {y : y(θ)≤ logρ(θ)}. For y ∈ Y, define ωy(θ) = ey(θ); note that ωy ∈ S. For
y ∈Y, we define V (y) =W (ωy), i.e.:
V (y) = λ
∑
γ
[
φγ log(γ +
∑
θ
αγ(θ)e
y(θ)vγ(θ))
]
−
∑
θ
τ(θ)ρ(θ)y(θ) +
∑
θ
τ(θ)ey(θ). (46)
We prove the theorem in a sequence of steps.
Step 1: V (y) is strictly convex for y ∈ Y. The first term is the log-sum-exp function, which is strictly
convex (recall γ > 0 for all γ); the second term is linear; and the last term is strictly convex.
Step 2: V (y) possesses a unique minimum y∗ on Y. Note that as y(θ)→−∞, we have V (y)→∞ (recall
that γ > 0 for all γ). Therefore V must possess a minimizer on Y; since V is strictly convex, this minimizer
is unique.
Step 3: Define s∗ = ωy∗ , i.e., s∗(θ) = ey
∗(θ). Then s∗ is the unique solution to (14)-(15). Since V (y) =
W (ωy), and the mapping y 7→ ωy maps Y to {s : 0 < s(θ) ≤ ρ(θ)} ⊂ S, it suffices to show that (14)-(15)
cannot be minimized at any s such that s(θ) = 0 for some s(θ). To see this, note that since V (y)→∞ as
y(θ)→−∞, it follows that W (s)→∞ as s(θ)→ 0. It follows that s∗ is the unique solution to (14)-(15).
Step 4: y∗ lies in the interior of Y, and thus s∗ lies in the interior of S. We have already shown that
s∗(θ) > 0 for all θ. It is straightforward to check that if y(θ) = logρ(θ), the derivative of V (y) becomes
positive, because the derivative of the first term of V (y) with respect to y(θ) is always positive, and the
derivatives of the last two terms cancel when y(θ) = logρ(θ). Therefore we must have y∗(θ)< ρ(θ) for all θ,
which suffices to establish the claim.
For the next step, fix an initial condition s0 ∈ S with s0(θ) > 0 for all θ, and let st be the resulting
trajectory of (7). We first observe that the right hand side of (7) is equal to τ(θ)ρ(θ) when s(θ) = 0, and this
is positive; therefore, we must have st(θ)> 0 for all t≥ 0. Define yt(θ) = log st(θ), and let yt = (yt(θ), θ ∈Θ).
Step 4: V is a Lyapunov function for {yt : t≥ 0}. Further, y∗ is the unique limit point of {yt : t≥ 0}, and
it is globally asymptotically stable over all y0 ∈Y. We consider the function V (yt) as a function of t. By the
chain rule, we have:
d
dt
V (yt) =
∑
θ
∂V (yt)
∂y(θ)
· dyt(θ)
dst(θ)
· dst(θ)
dt
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=
∑
θ
(∑
γ
(
λφγαγ(θ)e
yt(θ)vγ(θ)
γ +
∑
θ′ αγ(θ
′)eyt(θ′)vγ(θ′)
)
− τ(θ)ρ(θ) + τ(θ)eyt(θ)
)
· 1
st(θ)
·
(∑
γ
( −λφγαγ(θ)eyt(θ)vγ(θ)
γ +
∑
θ′ αγ(θ
′)eyt(θ′)vγ(θ′)
)
+ τ(θ)ρ(θ)− τ(θ)eyt(θ)
)
=−
∑
θ
1
st(θ)
(∑
γ
(
λφγαγ(θ)e
yt(θ)vγ(θ)
γ +
∑
θ′ αγ(θ
′)eyt(θ′)vγ(θ′)
)
− τ(θ)ρ(θ) + τ(θ)eyt(θ)
)2
=−
∑
θ
1
st(θ)
(
∂V (yt)
∂y(θ)
)2
.
It follows that dV (yt)/dt < 0 whenever yt 6= y∗, and dV (yt)/dt= 0 if and only if yt = y∗. V is clearly positive
definite, since it is strictly convex; and as shown, it is minimized at y∗. Thus it is a Lyapunov function for
yt, as required Boyd (2008).
Step 5: s∗ is the unique limit point of {st : t≥ 0}, and it is globally asymptotically stable over all s0 ∈ S.
This follows from the preceding observation, as long as s0 satisfies s0(θ)> 0 for all θ. If s0(θ) = 0 for some θ,
then again because the right hand side of (7) is positive when st(θ) = 0, we must have st(θ)≥ 0 for all t > 0.
In this case we need only define yt(θ) = log st(θ) for t > 0, the desired result follows from the preceding step.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Proposition 2 Throughout the proof, to simplify notation we fix aC , aL, and then suppress them
throughout the proof (e.g., instead of s∗(θ, j|aC , aL), we simply write s∗(θ, j)). We also assume for simplicity
that 0< aC < 1 and 0< aL < 1. This assumption can be made without loss of generality: if one or more of
these inequalities fails, we can reduce the type space by eliminating one or more of the treatment conditions,
and then replicate the argument below.
We recall from (20) that Qij(∞) is:
Qij(∞) = λ
∑
θ
∑
γ
φγ,ipγ,i(θ, j|s∗), (47)
where the choice probability is:
pγ,i(θ, j|s∗) = αγ,i(θ, j)vγ,i(θ, j)s
∗(θ, j)
γ,i +
∑
θ′
∑
j′=0,1αγ,i(θ
′, j′)vγ,i(θ′, j′)s∗(θ′, j′)
. (48)
We also make use of the following flow conservation condition cf. (13), which we rewrite here for the
experimental setting:
(ρ(θ, j)− s∗(θ, j))τν(θ, j) = λ
∑
γ
∑
i=0,1
φγ,ipγ,i(θ, j|s∗). (49)
Step 1: We have s∗(θ, j)→ ρ(θ, j) for all θ, j. Divide both sides of (49) by τν(θ, j)s∗(θ, j). The left hand
side of the equation becomes ρ(θ, j)/s∗(θ, j)− 1. The right hand side of the equation becomes
λ
τν(θ, j)
∑
γ
∑
i=0,1
φγ,iαγ,i(θ, j)vγ,i(θ, j)
γ,i +
∑
θ′
∑
j′=0,1αγ,i(θ
′, j′)vγ,i(θ′, j′)s∗(θ′, j′)
,
where we used the definition of the choice probability. Note that each term in the sum is bounded by one,
and there are finitely many terms, so the entire expression approaches zero as λ/τ → 0. Thus we have
ρ(θ, j)/s∗(θ, j)→ 1.
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Step 2: For all γ, θ, i, j, we have pγ,i(θ, j|s∗)→ pγ,i(θ, j|ρ). This follows because the choice probabilities
pγ,i(θ, j|s∗) are continuous in s∗.
Step 3: Completing the proof.. The limit in (26) follows immediately from Step 2 and the definition of
Qij(∞).
Proof of Proposition 3 We prove the proposition in a sequence of steps. We adopt the same conventions
as in the proof of Proposition 2: to simplify notation we fix aC , aL, and then suppress them throughout the
proof (e.g., instead of s∗(θ, j|aC , aL), we simply write s∗(θ, j)). We also again assume that 0< aC < 1 and
0<aL < 1; as before, this assumption is without loss of generality.
Step 1: We have s∗(θ, j)→ 0 for all θ, j. Suppose instead that for some θ, j pair, the limit inferior of
s∗(θ, j) is positive along the sequence of systems considered. Divide both sides of (49) by λ, and take the
limit inferior of each side. The left hand side approaches zero. On the other hand, the right hand side remains
positive (because φ, , α, and v are all positive). Thus we have a contradiction, establishing the claim.
Step 2: The following limit holds:
s∗(θ, j)
1/(λ/τ)
→ ρ(θ, j)ν(θ, j)∑
γ
∑
i=0,1 φγ,igγ,i(θ, j)
.
To prove this, divide both sides of (49) by λs∗(θ, j). The left hand side becomes
1
λ/τ
· (ρ(θ, j)− s
∗(θ, j)) · ν(θ, j)
s∗(θ, j)
.
The left hand side will then have the same limit as:
ρ(θ, j)ν(θ, j)
λ/τ
· 1
s∗(θ, j)
.
The limit of the right hand side becomes
∑
γ
∑
i=0,1 φγ,igγ,i(θ, j), establishing the desired result.
Step 3: For all γ, θ, i, j, the following limit holds:
pγ,i(θ, j|s∗)
1/(λ/τ)
→ ρ(θ, j)ν(θ, j)gγ,i(θ, j)∑
γ′
∑
i′=0,1 φγ′,i′gγ′,i′(θ, j)
.
This follows by the definition of pγ,i, and the previous step.
Step 4: Completing the proof. Given the definition of Qij in (47), the preceding step completes the proof.
Appendix B: Additional numerics
In this section we present two additional figures that depict behavior of the different estimators considered
in the transient phase. In Figure 3, the market is relatively demand-constrained, i.e., λ/τ is small; in Figure
4, the market is relatively supply-constrained, i.e., λ/τ is large.
0 1 2 3 4 5
Time
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
Transient dynamics for /  =0.3
naive CR
naive LR
naive TSR
improved TSR
GTE
Figure 3 Transient dynamics of estimators with λ/τ = 0.3. Parameters are as in Figure 1.
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Transient dynamics for /  =3
naive CR
naive LR
naive TSR
improved TSR
GTE
Figure 4 Transient dynamics of estimators with λ/τ = 3. Parameters are as in Figure 1.
Appendix C: Simulations
For every setting, we run 500 simulations for the time period [0,20] and then calculate the value of the
estimator on the time period [5,20]. We fix N = 1000, α= 1, = 1, and τ = 1 across all settings and for each
we consider three levels of demand: λ = 0.1,1,10. We then investigate several settings where we vary the
number of listing types, the number of customer types, and the utility that a customer has for each listing,
both before and after treatment.
For the base setting shown in Section 7.4 with homogeneous listings and customers, a customer has utility
v = 0.315 for a control listing and v˜ = 0.3937 for a treatment listing, corresponding to a mean field steady
state booking probability of 20 percent in the global control model and 23 percent in the global treatment
model. This change also corresponds to a 25 percent increase in the utility, due to treatment.
We then run simulations varying market parameters. Unless otherwise noted, all sets of market param-
eters are chosen to maintain the 20 and 23 percent booking probabilities in global control and treatment,
respectively.
Varying average utility. We again consider two settings in a homogeneous system with one customer
and one listing type, but scaling the utility v. Note that this can be interpreted a change in α and , since
changes to α and  can be written as a rescaling of the utility.
Rescaling v will change the booking probabilities in global treatment and control, but we maintain the
ratio v˜/v= 1.25.
• Lower utility: v= 0.155, v˜= 0.1938.
• Higher utility: v= 0.62, v˜= 0.775.
Both TSR estimators have lower standard error for the system with lower utility than the system with higher
utility. For the lower utility system, ĜTE
TSR
lies within 10 percent and ĜTE
TSRI
lies within 35 percent of the
lowest standard error across market balance conditions. For the higher utility system, ĜTE
TSR
lies within 20
percent and ĜTE
TSRI
lies within 45 percent of the lowest standard error across market balance conditions.
Heterogeneity of Customers. There is one listing type θ and two customer types γ1, γ2. We fix the
size of the treatment utility increase such that v˜γ1(θ) = 1.25 · vγ1(θ) and v˜γ2(θ) = 1.25 · vγ2(θ). We vary the
heterogeneity of the customers by varying the difference |vγ1(θ)− vγ2(θ)|.
• Low heterogeneity: vγ1(θ) = 0.31, vγ2(θ) = 0.315
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• Moderate heterogeneity: vγ1(θ) = 0.27, vγ2(θ) = 0.35
• High heterogeneity: vγ1(θ) = 0.2, vγ2(θ) = 0.45.
In all three cases, ĜTE
TSR
has the lowest standard error of all estimators or a standard error within 12 percent
of the lowest. ĜTE
TSRI
has the lowest standard error for λ/τ = 10 and within 43 percent of the lowest in other
regimes of market balance.
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